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On the Demographic Composition of Colleges and Universities in Market Equilibrium
By DENNIS EPPLE, RICHARD ROMANO, AND HOLGER SIEG* Achieving diversity in the racial and ethnic makeup of the student body is one of the objectives that a college pursues in making decisions about admission and financial aid.' There has been a tremendous amount of debate about policies that colleges should adopt, or be proscribed from adopting, with respect to diversity. Rather than join this largely normative debate, we adopt a positive focus, investigating how colleges' quests for ethnic and racial diversity affect admission and financial aid policies, the college quality hierarchy, and the distribution of whites and nonwhite students across colleges of differing qualities. We provide a theoretical framework for investigating the effects of preferences for diversity augmented with results from a parallel computational model calibrated to U.S. data.
The effects of efforts to achieve diversity in colleges depend not only on the weight that colleges give to diversity, but also on the value that prospective students place on diversity. Diversity may be of concern to no one, only to colleges, to both colleges and students, or to colleges and a subset of students. We first describe a baseline model without preferences for diversity and then examine three alternatives in which preferences for racial diversity are present.
I. Theoretical Background
Here we briefly summarize a theoretical model and results which are developed in detail in Epple et al. (2002a, b) . A potential student is characterized by three variables: race (r), household income (y), and score (s) on a standardized college entrance exam. Race is dichotomous, with individuals either white (w) or nonwhite (nw). Let Fr denote the proportion of race r in the population. Race-conditioned distributions on (s, y) are assumed to be continuous on 2+. We also assume that (r, s, y) is observable for all potential students who attend college in equilibrium. We assume that all who go to college take the entrance exam.
The potential student (or his household) maximizes an increasing utility function of numeraire (x) and educational attainment (a): U = U(x, a). The numeraire is given by x = y -Pi if college i is attended, i = 1, 2, ...1, where pi is tuition at college i. Educational attainment is an increasing function of score and the perceived quality (Qr) of the college attended: a = a(Qr, s). We examine several college quality measures discussed below. If no college is attended, then Qr = Qr, which can then be interpreted as quality of high school. We assume a positive income elasticity of demand for school quality and a nonnegative score elasticity of demand. Taking as given colleges' tuition and admission policies, students choose among their options to maximize utility.
There are n colleges, differentiated ex ante by their "endowment earnings," Ri, which consists of all nontuition earnings. Number the colleges so that RI < R2 < < R,. Subject to their budget constraint, each college chooses tuitionadmission policy and expenditure on educational inputs to maximize its perception of quality, QC, taking as given its endowment and students' equilibrium alternatives. Letting The diversity cost generally varies with race and across the models. In the baseline model with diversity neutrality, z' = 0. In models 2, 3, and 4, for colleges with the same characteristics (I, 0, k), Z2 > Z4 > Z3 > 0.
2 In addition to learning from one's peers, it is plausible that faculty prefer to teach more acadernically inclined students, helping colleges with better peer groups to hire more effective faculty. The positive model is also consistent with students' reputations (e.g., in the job market) being enhanced by going to college with higher-scoring students. There is a large, growing, and controversial literature on peer effects by social scientists. Here we mention just some of the empirical studies on peer effects in higher education. Bruce Sacerdote ( The discounting to higher scores that arises for given race along a college's boundary loci reflects, of course, the value of higher score as an input to quality (as perceived by colleges). Analogously, when colleges value diversity, a student from the underrepresented race on a college's (race-conditioned) boundary locus pays lower tuition than a student of the same score from the overrepresented race also on a (race-conditioned) boundary locus of the college. While students in the interior of a college's attendance space in the (s, y) plane (for given r) pay somewhat higher tuition than their EMCri, the discounting to score and to the underrepresented race (the latter in models 2, 3, and 4) persists if the degree of competition is moderate.
The positive income elasticity of demand for college quality and the nonnegative score elasticity, along with Proposition 2c, imply that the equilibrium attendance sets satisfy some stratification properties.
PROPOSITION 3: (a) Within-race income stratification across the quality hierarchy as perceived by students arises in equilibrium. For given ability and race, if student I attends college i and student 2 attends college j with Qr > QJ., then Yi > Y2. (b) Within-race score stratification across the quality hierarchy as perceived by students arises in equilibrium if (qIlq1)i weakly ascends along that quality hierarchy. Under the latter condition and for given income and race, if student I attends college i and student 2 attends college j with Qr > QJr, then s1 -It bears emphasis that, given differences in the distribution of types (s, y) across the races, attendance sets will differ whenever diversity matters to just colleges or to both colleges and (some) students. The nature and implications of these differences is a primary concern, which we examine computationally.
II. Computational Model and Results
In our calibration, we seek to capture broad regularities with respect to the distributions of incomes, SAT scores, and college attendance within the United States, and also the broad patterns of variation in SAT scores, endowments, tuitions, and financial aid in U.S. private institutions offering four-year undergraduate degrees. We use data from the U.S. Census and data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). We calibrate using model 1, assuming six colleges and two groups (whites and nonwhites). Data for nonwhites are obtained by combining data for the African-American and Hispanic populations.
Here we summarize our calibration, referring readers to Epple et al. (2002b) We assume a Cobb-Douglas utility-achievement function, with exponents on numeraire consumption, college inputs, and mean scores of 1, 0.06, and 0.03, respectively.3 The exponent on percentage nonwhite, 4,, is set equal to 0 in model 1. Our cost function for colleges is cubic: 22.7 + 200k + 7,043k2 + 925,000(k -k*)3 + kI, where k is the fraction of the population served by the college and k* is the cost-minimizing scale, which we set equal to 0.06. The outside option is assumed to be the same across races and chosen such that the equilibrium proportion of the population attending four-year colleges is the fraction observed in the data, 28.2 percent.
A summary of equilibrium in our calibrated model is provided in the first column of Table  1 . Note in Table 1 Table 1 , we see that the proportion of minority students is smaller in higher-ranked colleges, this due to the differences across races in the calibrated distributions on (s, y). The model is calibrated to the empirical mean SAT scores, average educational costs, and mean discount to score, so the correspondence between the equilibrium values of these variables for model 1 and the empirical values is imposed. The main predictive weakness of the model is that the equilibrium values of average income of college attendees are more than one-third higher than the values we find in our NCES data. We are presently extending our model to permit consideration of preferences for income diversity as well as racial diversity, an extension that we expect will increase income diversity within schools, reducing mean incomes.
To provide a meaningful scaling of achievement, we set normed achievement equal to income, calibrating so that mean normed achievement for whites equals mean income for We also see that model 2 not only has the highest average proportion of nonwhites, but also the most nearly equal proportions across colleges. Model 3 yields the lowest proportion of nonwhites and the most variation in this proportion across the colleges. The differing preferences for diversity have very modest effects on mean SAT scores and discounts for high SAT scores, but quite substantial effects on participation of nonwhites. This is due to there being many nonwhite students on the margin of attending college.
III. Conclusion
We find that an objective of colleges that places weight on the racial mix of their student body can have predictions that are broadly consistent with what is observed. Not surprisingly, colleges will be more diverse if households also value diversity. What may be more useful in choosing among the specifications is that predicted variation in diversity along the college quality hierarchy is substantially lower when households value diversity than when they do not.
This paper is part of a larger project aimed at empirically identifying objectives and interactions of institutions of higher education. We are the first to admit that the spartan model here can only go so far in predicting the characteristics of higher education in the United States. The model fails to predict the substantial needbased aid that is observed in the data. The neat stratification properties that are predicted are an exaggeration. State-affiliated colleges may pursue substantially different objectives. Student preferences are likely to vary in more ways than we have allowed. Nevertheless, we believe that the modeling here helps to clarify the equilibrium promotion of diversity in higher education and provides a useful building block.
